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NOTES 
PERMEATING THE GOOD OLD BOYS CLUB: 
WHY HOLDING THE COMMISSIONER OF 
BASEBALL TO A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF 
LOYALTY IS IN THE “BEST INTERESTS” OF 
THE GAME 
INTRODUCTION  
When Major League Baseball—most affectionately regarded as “The 
National Pastime”—was founded in 1876, there was no national audience. 
There was no free agency, no multi-million dollar player contracts, and no 
grossly-lucrative endorsement, merchandising, or television deals. The 
simplicity of the game undercut any readily apparent need for the League’s 
pioneer founders to implement a strong, centralized league office or an 
individual to preside over it.1 But as the simple game developed into a 
business, the breadth of operations became difficult to control locally and 
the opportunities to corrupt the nascent concept of a professional sports 
league were exploited by individuals on and off the field. The slowly 
brewing pot of conflict boiled over in 1920, when the beloved “Shoeless” 
Joe Jackson and seven of his “Chicago Black Sox” teammates were accused 
of fixing the 1919 World Series for a cut of the gambling payout they 
facilitated.2 With team owner and public confidence in the informal league 
office irreparably harmed, the Major League Baseball clubs unanimously 
voted for the creation of a single, impartial commissioner to oversee the 
operations of the League.3 Since the office’s birth in 1921, the 
Commissioner of Major League Baseball has seen his powers adapt to and 
expand with the evolution of the game’s on- and off-field components in 
spite of a magnitude of legal challenges by players, coaches, and owners.4 
Today, Major League Baseball is not only still an American staple, but 
a multi-billion dollar international business enterprise.5 At the heart of this 
                                                                                                                           
 1. MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (2d ed. 2007). 
 2. See E. ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT (1987). 
 3. Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
876 (1978). 
 4. The early parameters of the Commissioner of Major League Baseball’s powers stemmed 
from legal clashes over the office’s broad discretion in the use of disciplinary powers. Matthew B. 
Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports Commissioners: A Historical 
and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1417 
(1990). Often, these disciplinary actions came from disputes arising out of improper dealings by 
owners or players in regard to league rules. See id. at 1414. While it is important to consider how 
courts have treated the Commissioner’s power to punish individuals in the “best interests” of the 
game, this note will analyze whether this power extends to the Commissioner’s power to 
determine who may or may not own a team. 
 5. The growth of Major League Baseball’s revenue streams, like many other sports leagues’, 
has been astounding. Despite the flailing economy as a whole, the League reported revenues of $7 
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organization is the Commissioner, whose responsibilities are no longer 
relegated to the simple operations of the game, but the management of a 
cash cow medusa comprised of thirty separate entities simultaneously 
“cooperating” for the greater benefit of the League and “competing” for 
labor and revenue.6 Many exorbitantly wealthy individuals have often 
pooled their millions in an effort to buy the right to own and operate a 
Major League Baseball franchise. But who gets the privilege to own one of 
these teams? What happens when a team falls into severe financial distress? 
What is the extent of the Commissioner’s powers in determining whether to 
hand that owner a shovel to dig itself out of a financial grave, to dig that 
owner out himself, or to whistle towards the sky as he kicks dirt into the 
hole? 
In recent years, the answers to these questions have been severely 
clouded. The concurrent financial struggles of the Los Angeles Dodgers and 
the New York Mets have brought to light what only “outcast” owners and 
the media will readily admit: team ownership in Major League Baseball is 
by and large a “good old boys club”7 that is greatly influenced by the 
Commissioner and his inner circle. In 2011, the Los Angeles Dodgers filed 
for bankruptcy when majority owner Frank McCourt and his wife began 
divorce proceedings, calling into question the team’s ownership rights, and 
exposing less-than-admirable use of team funds.8 The year was not any 
better for the New York Mets, as majority owner Fred Wilpon and his 
brother-in-law were accused of being integrally related to the infamous 
Bernie Madoff fraud, and were slapped with a $1 billion lawsuit by the 
trustee of the victims of that Ponzi scheme.9 However, Commissioner Bud 
Selig has treated the two situations disparately: 
Selig approved a $25 million loan to the Mets last November when they 
faced a cash crunch yet left the principal owner Fred Wilpon to fix his 
financial woes. With the Dodgers, Selig invoked his ‘best interests of 
                                                                                                                           
billion dollars in 2010—over a 6 percent increase from the previous season. Maury Brown, MLB 
Revenues Grown From $1.4 Billion in 1995 to $7 Billion in 2010, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5167 
:mlb-revenues-grown-from-14-billion-in-1995-to-7-billion-in-2010&catid=30:mlb-news&Itemid 
=42. 2010’s numbers represent a staggering 254 percent increase in revenues over the last fifteen 
years. Id. 
 6. COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 1. 
 7. In reference to Major League Baseball, the phrase “good old boys club” was first coined 
by Marge Schott. Cliff Radel, Former Reds Owner Discusses Her 3 Great Loves, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, Feb. 26, 2002, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/02/26/loc_radel_marge_schott 
.html. Schott was the majority owner of the Cincinnati Reds before she was “forced to sell her 
majority stake in the Reds by Major League Baseball” after inflammatory racial remarks. Id. 
 8. William C. Rhoden, Dissecting the Twin Tales of Teams in Distress, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/sports/baseball/07rhoden.html?_r=1&ref=losangeles 
dodgers. 
 9. Richard Sandomir, The Dodgers, the Mets and the Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/sports/baseball/01dodgers.html?ref=losangeles 
dodgers. 
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baseball’ powers, installed a monitor, Tom Schieffer, to run the team, and 
refused to approve a local cable-television deal with Fox that McCourt 
said would guarantee long-term stability.10 
Many critics have cried favoritism in response to the uneven treatment 
of the two teams, and have urged the Commissioner to act in a more 
evenhanded manner.11 However, Selig’s seemingly superior treatment of 
Fred Wilpon and the Mets is not an outlier in the League’s dealings with 
financially unstable teams.12 It is also not the first time that Selig has 
appeared to squeeze someone out of the ownership picture altogether.13 
Although there might be meritorious reasons to approve or deny these 
ownership requests, no working standard exists on which to evaluate the 
Commissioner’s decision-making process. Without this standard, his 
decisions could easily be just as arbitrary as a hunch that a manager uses on 
the field. When commenting on the dynamic between the League, the 
owners, and the judicial system in the Dodgers’ bankruptcy proceedings, 
bankruptcy attorney Thomas Salerno said, “That’s always been a concern of 
leagues with these bankruptcies—that they have a bankruptcy judge 
deciding what is ‘good faith’. . . . Sports leagues are not used to having that 
kind of oversight.”14 This note will argue that the Commissioner’s conduct 
should be evaluated based on a good faith standard when making decisions 
regarding ownership changes of financially distressed teams.15 
Part I of this note will first provide a brief overview of the traditional 
structure of a professional sports league and why the unique legal 
implications of such a corporate anomaly make challenging the 
Commissioner’s powers difficult.16 It will then introduce the “best interests 
of the game” power granted to the Commissioner’s office by the Major 
League Constitution, and the breadth of that power as determined by 
Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn.17 
Part II of this note will examine Commissioner Selig’s seemingly 
uneven treatment of franchises in financial flux since the turn of the 
                                                                                                                           
 10. Id.  
 11. See, e.g., Rhoden, Dissecting the Twin Tales of Teams in Distress, supra note 8. 
 12. See, e.g., Bill Shaikin, Frank McCourt Goes on a Fishing Expedition, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
26, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-0927-mlb-dodgers-20110927,0,3903262.story. 
 13. See, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa 1993); see also, 
Radel, supra note 7. 
 14. Bill Shaikin, Bankruptcy Judge Rules Against Frank McCourt, L.A. TIMES., Sept. 30, 
2011, http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-1001-dodgers-mccourt-20111001,0,4004563.story. 
 15. It should be acknowledged that the Commissioner’s power with regards to choosing who 
may or may not own a team is not absolute. Issues like team ownership bids must also be 
approved by the other half of the “good old boys club”—a majority of the League’s current 
owners. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. II, § 4. Still, it may be argued that the desire to be part of 
this inside circle and close to the Commissioner provides owners with more than enough 
incentive, and maybe even fear, to share the Commissioner’s opinions. 
 16. COZZILLIO ET. AL., supra note 1. 
 17. Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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century. In doing so, it will closely inspect the bankruptcy proceedings of 
the Los Angeles Dodgers, including the significantly divergent positions of 
owner Frank McCourt and the Commissioner.18 It will also chronicle 
Commissioner Selig’s handling of three other MLB franchises facing 
financial troubles over the course of the last five years—the Florida 
Marlins, the Texas Rangers, and the New York Mets—to expose the lack of 
discernible decision-making process exhibited by the Office of the 
Commissioner. 
Part III of this Note will tackle the threshold challenges of bringing a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Commissioner and adduce 
arguments that prove Major League Baseball should be treated as a 
traditional corporation when faced with a lawsuit implicating the 
Commissioner’s duties to the League and its members. It will contend that 
despite Major League Baseball’s status as an unincorporated association, 
the Commission still owes the League and its teams the same fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty as would a director or officer of a traditional 
corporation. Next, it will discuss whether the Major League Constitution’s 
waiver of recourse clause precludes an owner from bringing a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against the Commissioner, and consequently conclude 
that the manager of an unincorporated association cannot limit his liability 
for a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
Part IV will then turn to the battle between a plaintiff’s desire to invoke 
a fiduciary duty of loyalty claim and a defendant’s contention that he has 
exercised sound business expertise and fulfilled his fiduciary duty of care. It 
will liken the issue of court deference to the Commissioner’s “best 
interests” power to corporate law’s “business judgment rule.” It will next 
explore the current uncertainty regarding Delaware’s treatment of a 
fiduciary’s duties of care, good faith, and loyalty, and where a hypothetical 
claim brought by former Los Angeles Dodgers owner Frank McCourt 
would fall. 
Finally, Part V will argue that judicial treatment of Major League 
Baseball as the American legal system’s favorite son demands that the 
Commissioner’s “best interest of the game” power be held to an appropriate 
standard for the actual best interest of the game. It will contend that, at the 
very least, the Commissioner be asked to account for the steps he has taken 
when aiding the financial endeavors of member clubs as well as any 
disparity in his decision-making process. This type of scrutiny will ensure 
that personal favoritism or lasting grudges do not affect a current or 
prospective owner’s ability to control a Major League Baseball team. 
                                                                                                                           
 18. See In re Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, 465 B.R. 18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
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I. STRUCTURE OF THE LEAGUE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
A.  MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL: AN UNTRADITIONAL 
“TRADITIONAL” LEAGUE 
Major League Baseball is governed by three documents: (1) the Major 
League Constitution (MLC); (2) the Basic Agreement with the Major 
League Baseball Players Association (the collective bargaining agreement); 
and (3) the Major League Rules.19 The Major League Constitution 
“constitutes an agreement among the Major League Baseball Clubs, each of 
which shall be entitled to the benefits of and shall be bound by all the terms 
and provisions.”20 Article II of the MLC establishes The Office of the 
Commissioner of Baseball as “an unincorporated association also doing 
business as Major League Baseball.”21 This clause structures the League as 
what is commonly referred to as the “traditional” sports league model.22 
Each team is owned separately by an individual or group of individuals23 
and is legally considered a member club of the league.24 While these 
member clubs are clearly established as revenue-generating business 
operations, the League itself is a non-profit entity which distributes excess 
income to the owners of each member club.25 Within this structure, the 
commissioner’s office handles day-to-day league operations, while the 
individual teams are left to handle matters such as team operations relating 
to the game itself, facilities, marketing and sale of tickets, and local 
broadcasting contracts.26 Although this traditional model has significant 
commercial benefits for the league and team owners, its unique structure 
remains slippery enough to prevent the legal field from comfortably 
grasping its place amongst games and businesses.27 
However, unlike every other professional sports league, Major League 
Baseball is completely exempt from antitrust status.28 This has made it 
increasingly difficult to challenge the Commissioner of Major League 
Baseball’s powers on these grounds outside the arena of labor disputes, and 
in particular, his ability to influence ownership decisions. In Piazza v. 
Major League Baseball, two individuals brought suit against the Office of 
                                                                                                                           
 19. See MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. The Major League Constitution was originally adopted as the 
“Major League Agreement” on January 12, 1921, and has undergone periodic amendments 
throughout its ninety-year existence. Id. 
 20. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. I. 
 21. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. II, § 1. 
 22. COZZILLIO ET. AL., supra note 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. II. 
 25. COZZILLIO ET. AL., supra note 1. 
 26. Id. at 20–21. 
 27. Id.  
 28. For a history of the development of baseball’s unique antitrust exemption, see Thomas J. 
Ostertag, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: Its History & Continuing Importance, 4 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 54 (2004). 
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the Commissioner, Major League Baseball, and various major league clubs 
to challenge the denial of their partnership’s ownership application.29 The 
unsuccessful bidders, Vincent Piazza and Vincent Tirendi, alleged two 
wrongful grounds of denial: first, that the League’s “background character 
check” led to false accusations that the two had mafia ties; and second, they 
felt that the League did not fairly evaluate the bid because it had no 
intention of letting the San Francisco Giants relocate to Tampa Bay, 
Florida.30 Aside from the typical antitrust challenges that repeatedly assault 
major sports leagues, the plaintiffs claimed that MLB violated the First and 
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution on due process claims, denial of 
equal protection, and restriction of their freedom to contract.31 Still, these 
claims were closely tied to the historic antitrust exemption, as Piazza and 
Tirendi argued that the “unique” exemption by the federal courts allowed 
them to sue the private entity under the terms of the Constitution as acting 
“with the authority of the government.”32 Despite the creativity of the direct 
constitutional claims, the court swiftly dismissed them for lack of evidence 
that the government exerted “‘significant,’ active encouragement” of 
MLB’s denial of the team’s sale.33 
With one possible avenue to challenge closed, the court seemed to open 
another familiar door that had been all but triple-steel-reinforced; the 
judge—in stark contrast with relevant judicial precedent of the Supreme 
Court and other circuits—held that the Federal Baseball Antitrust 
Exemption was limited to the player reserve system, and not team 
ownership.34 As a result, MLB’s motion to dismiss the federal antitrust 
claims was denied and a judgment on the case’s merits was to follow the 
development of a factual record.35 With the League’s legally supreme status 
in peril, the Commissioner settled the suit before the judge reached a 
verdict.36 However, while this decision seemed to have revived the 
                                                                                                                           
 29. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 30. Id. at 423.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 425.  
 33. Id. at 426 (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 
(1987)).  
 34. Id. at 421.  
 35. Id. at 438–40.  
 36. Mitchell Nathanson, The Irrelevance of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: A Historical 
Review, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 42 (2005). Along with the settlement, a third and creative 
challenge quietly perished without address. The plaintiffs’ raised a civil rights claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 that Major League Baseball “denied them the right to participate in the purchase of 
a Major League Baseball team from an owner who contracted to sell the team to plaintiffs”  and 
“acted in concert with the City of San Francisco to prevent the Giants from being relocated.” 
Piazza, 831 F. Supp at 426–27. In a possibly replicable line of reasoning, the court denied 
Baseball’s motion to dismiss for failure to establish the element of “acting under color of state 
law” because the Mayor of San Francisco publically stated that he pleaded with MLB to do 
everything it could to keep the team in the city (as Mayors often do), thus showing evidence of 
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possibility of challenging the Commissioner’s powers on antitrust issues, 
the case did not gain much momentum as later courts explicitly declined to 
follow its deviation from past precedent.37 
B. THE COMMISSIONER: THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOOD OLD BOYS 
CLUB AND HIS “BEST INTERESTS” POWERS 
The near impossibility of bringing an antitrust claim is just one barrier 
to challenging the Commissioner’s power. Another rather famous barrier—
the Commissioner’s “best interests of baseball” clause—is as antique and 
enduring as the League’s antitrust exemption. However, while an owner 
may sidestep the antitrust exemption by holding the Commissioner to a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty, Selig’s broad powers under the “best interests” 
clause absolutely must be addressed and conquered to successfully bring 
any breach of fiduciary duty claim. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn 
marked perhaps the most significant decision regarding the Commissioner 
of Major League Baseball’s power. In this preeminent case, the Seventh 
Circuit first addressed the breadth of the Commissioner’s “best interests of 
baseball” power.38 Commissioner Bowie Kuhn had determined that the 
Oakland Athletics’ sale of three player contracts to the New York Yankees 
and Boston Red Sox was contrary to the best interests of the game, its 
integrity, and the public’s confidence in the League.39 The court reasoned 
that the Commissioner must have the authority to determine whether any 
act—not just ones that break the Major League Rules or moral standards—
is “not in the best interests of baseball” to prevent a potentially disastrous 
judicial venture into the “complex” rules and code of the game.40 It further 
held that the court was in no position to determine whether Kuhn’s decision 
to disallow the player assignments was right or wrong, but did believe the 
Commissioner acted in good faith throughout his investigation and 
deliberation of the issue.41 Overcoming the breadth of this power will be an 
essential element to the hypothetical case that Frank McCourt will bring 
within this note. 
II. A CASE STUDY OF FOUR TROUBLED FRANCHISES 
In order to create a basis on which an owner could challenge the 
Commissioner of Major League Baseball’s motives and decision-making 
                                                                                                                           
concerted activity. Id. Although this could potentially be a compelling ground for challenge in the 
future, it is not within the scope of this note. 
 37. See, e.g., Baseball at Trotwood, LLC v. Dayton Prof’l Club, LLC, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 
1175 n.24 (S.D. Ohio 1999); McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 
1995). 
 38. Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 39. Id. at 531.  
 40. Id. at 539.  
 41. Id.  
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process, it is essential to evaluate the nature of his past actions. To do this, 
one must first look towards the source of controversy. The notion that 
Major League Baseball is a “good old boys club” has lingered for over a 
century. However, questions concerning the disparate treatment of certain 
owners (and potential owners) have never been more prevalent than in the 
case of the Los Angeles Dodgers. This section will provide a thorough 
taxonomy of the very public heavyweight battle between Bud Selig, the 
Commissioner of Major League Baseball, and Frank McCourt, the owner of 
the Los Angeles Dodgers. It will then analyze Selig’s treatment of 
franchises in similar situations—a task that McCourt aimed to expose, but 
was denied in a Delaware bankruptcy court.42 
A. THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS 
Frank McCourt bought a struggling Los Angeles Dodgers franchise 
from the Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. in 2004.43 The deal had two 
separate agreements which allotted for a $330 million payment for the 
franchise and a $100 million payment for the real estate surrounding the 
stadium.44 The purchase—which consisted of a $125 million loan from Fox 
to an affiliate of McCourt—was “unanimously approved by the Major 
League Baseball and supported by the Commissioner.”45 Selig further 
approved McCourt’s plan to reorganize the team’s operations by creating a 
new entity through the structured securitization of the team’s future ticket 
sales.46 
The Dodgers enjoyed on-field success immediately following 
McCourt’s acquisition. The team made the playoffs in four of the following 
six years and ranked in the top three in total attendance from 2004-2010.47 
However, problems began when Frank and Jamie McCourt separated in 
2009. Ms. McCourt brought public the apparent commingling of the 
couple’s lavish lifestyle and the team’s internal operations when she filed 
                                                                                                                           
 42. Order Scheduling Evidentiary Hearing at 11, In re Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, 465 B.R. 18 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (No. 11-12010) [hereinafter Order Scheduling Evidentiary Hearing]. 
 43. Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Orders (i) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain 
Postpetition Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, and 364, and (ii) Scheduling a Final 
Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and 4001(C) at 4–5, In re Los Angeles Dodgers 
LLC, 465 B.R. 18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (No. 11-12010), 2011 WL 2535793 [hereinafter 
Emergency Motion for Postpetition Financing]. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 5–6. McCourt and the Dodgers stressed this point heavily in their filing, noting that 
leveraged positions that helped contribute to strained funds were disclosed to and approved by the 
Commissioner, and that approval estops the Commissioner from arguing that team structure is 
disallowable. Id.  
 47. The Dodgers had the second highest attendance in the League from 2004 to 2007, the third 
highest attendance in 2008 and 2010, and the League’s highest attendance in 2009. MLB 
Attendance Report, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/attendance/_/year/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
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for divorce in October of 2009.48 Along with claiming half-ownership of the 
team, Ms. McCourt claimed she had the right to “enjoy[] all prerequisites, 
emoluments, and benefits of co-ownership of an/or employment by the 
Dodger Entities.”49 Among those “prerequisites” and “benefits” were 
unlimited travel expenses that included flights on private jets and five-star 
hotels, five nights of business lunches and dinners per week, Dodger 
payment of private country club fees and expenses, and access to her 
“Dodger credit card.”50 The petition also listed multiple real estate holdings, 
including two homes in Holmby Hills, California, two Malibu residences, 
two properties in Massachusetts, a ski condo in Vail, Colorado, and 
undeveloped property in Montana and Cabo San Lucas, Mexico.51 
The perceived image that ownership was wasting team funds combined 
with an on-field drop in performance frustrated Dodgers fans in 2010, and 
ticket sales declined sharply towards the end of the season. Attendance 
problems would drop even more severely the next season when, on top of 
frustration with the McCourt’s public divorce, a San Francisco Giants fan 
was brutally beaten outside Dodgers Stadium on opening day.52 With 
ownership uncertainty, a dismal start, and fans fearing for their safety, the 
Dodgers filled approximately 600,000 fewer seats in 2011 and fell from 
third to tenth in attendance.53 The decrease in the previously securitized 
ticket streams exacerbated financial constraints and sent Frank McCourt 
into financial flux. 
The revelations about the McCourt tenure evidently surprised Bud 
Selig, the Commissioner of Major League Baseball. It also commenced the 
very public deterioration of the personal relationship between McCourt and 
Selig. After months of watching the Los Angeles Dodgers get dragged 
through the mud of the McCourt divorce, Commissioner Selig sprang into 
action with his ace in the hole—the Commissioner’s “best interests of the 
                                                                                                                           
 48. Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, McCourt v. McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 
4746193 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Jamie McCourt Divorce Petition]. 
 49. Id. Attachment 9 at 1–3. In her declaration portion of the divorce petition, Ms. McCourt 
eloquently explained that her and her husband’s “marital lifestyle since [they] bought the Dodger 
Assets in 2004 [was] inextricably intertwined with [the couple’s] ownership of the Dodgers. As a 
result, many of our expenses were paid directly by the Dodger entities.” Id. Declaration of 
Petitioner Jamie McCourt at 12.  
 50. Id. Attachment 9 at 1–3. Ms. McCourt requested these things and spousal support to 
“maintain the financial status quo and [her] lifestyle. Id. Declaration of Petitioner Jamie McCourt 
at 13.  
 51. Id. Declaration of Petitioner Jamie McCourt at 13.  
 52. Ian Lovett, Dodger Stadium Beating Highlights Fans’ Unease, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/sports/baseball/10dodgers.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=bryan%20
stow&st=cse. 
 53. See MLB Attendance Report, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/attendance/_/year/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
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game” power.54 On April 20, the Commissioner released a statement that he 
would be appointing a representative “to oversee all aspects of the business 
and the day-to-day operations of the club,” citing “deep concerns regarding 
the finances and operations” of the team.55 The decision meant that the 
League was effectively taking control of the team and running it for the 
remainder of the season. 
Struggling with cash flow problems, the Dodgers began negotiations 
with FOX Sports to formulate a new deal that would extend the 
broadcaster’s exclusive rights and provide the Dodgers with funds to meet 
operating expenses.56 The proposed deal would hinge on a $385 million 
loan from FOX Sports to a media subsidiary owned by McCourt.57 But the 
McCourt divorce battle continued to weave its way into team affairs, as 
Jamie McCourt’s ongoing assertions of partial ownership of the Dodgers 
threatened to roadblock any potential deal involving the team’s business 
affairs. The McCourts eventually worked out a complicated divorce 
settlement that postponed any decision of team ownership until August 1, 
2011 while simultaneously guiding terms on which the massive loan would 
be disbursed.58 
The divorce settlement first stipulated that $235 million of the $385 
million loan would be distributed to the Dodgers, with $23.5 million of that 
sum used to repay FOX Sports’ previous cash advances and the rest used to 
meet current Dodgers’ payroll and operating expenses.59 Another $80 
million of the deal would pay off the debt of various McCourt 
subsidiaries.60 $50 million would be held in a court managed account and 
paid to Ms. McCourt should her claim of ownership interest in the Los 
Angeles Dodgers be denied.61 Finally, Mr. and Ms. McCourt would be 
allotted $5 million each for legal fees accrued during the divorce 
proceedings and another $5 million each to use as they pleased.62 
All media deals such as the Dodgers’ proposed FOX Sports deal must 
be reviewed and approved by the Commissioner.63 From the time 
negotiations commenced, Frank McCourt urged Selig to approve various 
forms of the FOX Sports deal. On June 20, the Commissioner sent a 
detailed letter to the Dodgers rejecting the proposal, pursuant again to this 
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“best interests of baseball” power.64 Selig’s general argument revolved 
around his belief that McCourt was handicapping the future of the team for 
a quick fix of his personal financial issues.65 He cited how the transaction 
with FOX during the exclusive contracting window would preclude the 
team from capitalizing on a competitive market for media rights after the 
current deal’s expiration.66 Instead, it would accelerate the club’s future 
media revenue payments into the $385 million loan to fix short term 
liquidity problems while leaving the team susceptible to similar financial 
crisis as early as 2013.67 Furthermore, the League argued that McCourt 
would be leveraging the team even further than it already was by dividing 
the club’s assets and borrowing against them, while personally guaranteeing 
payment.68 Selig was particularly concerned with McCourt’s personal 
guarantees when he received documents that stated the owner had only 
$264,000 in liquid assets.69 However, the most emphatic argument the 
Commissioner made was his objection to the manner in which the proceeds 
of the deal would be allocated. He took great exception to the fact that a 
large portion of the $385 million loan would go towards non-baseball 
purposes such as the McCourt divorce settlement and personal use.70 He 
also lumped the $80 million debt payment to Dodger affiliates as a non-
baseball purpose.71 The length of the deal also played a large role in the 
decision, as Selig argued that if McCourt were forced to sell the team, any 
future owner would be locked into a below-market-value deal for seventeen 
years without enjoying the benefit of the up-front loan the team would get 
under McCourt’s ownership.72 The letter ends with a strong accusation that 
Selig has consistently reiterated in court filings, interviews, and press 
releases: 
As the Dodgers’ control owner, you have the duty to manage the Club “for 
its own sake, in a sound fiscal manner, and not for the benefit of another 
business,” and a contractual commitment to operate the Dodgers “with the 
intention of being profitable and with respect to all operations and control 
in the best interests of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Major League 
Baseball.” Instead, you have run the Club consistently for your own 
benefit and that of your family members, and your lifestyle, with little or 
no regard for the distinction between the Club’s finances and your own.73 
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The Commissioner’s unwavering rejection was not well received by the 
Dodgers organization. The team released a statement on behalf of McCourt 
claiming that they had complied with all of Selig’s requests, and that the 
divorce court deemed the transaction should be consummated immediately 
as it was in the team’s best interests.74 He accused Selig of unfairly 
prohibiting a $235 million injection into the franchise that could potentially 
lead to the destruction of the Los Angeles Dodgers.75 The spat between 
owner and Commissioner became even more personal as McCourt 
threatened to “explore vigorously” the team’s options to seek remedy 
against Selig and his decision.76 
The decision sent Frank McCourt scrambling for a way to find 
financing. With other obligations fast approaching, the Dodgers were forced 
to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.77 On June 27, 2011, Frank McCourt and 
the Dodgers filed motions in the District of Delaware’s U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court seeking the court’s authorization to obtain post-petition financing and 
the ability to satisfy its obligations under the collective bargaining 
agreement.78 Having no way of covering the team’s operational expenses 
over the next twelve months, the main goal of the motions was to convince 
the court to allow the Dodgers to obtain a bridge loan that would buy 
McCourt time to sell the team’s lucrative television rights.79 McCourt’s 
preference was to obtain outside financing from the private hedge fund 
Highbridge Capital.80 In consideration of the loan, Highbridge would have 
“super-priority” liens on all of McCourt’s personal, real, and intangible 
assets.81 The Dodgers would also have to pay a particularly high interest 
rate of LIBOR plus 7 percent monthly and would have to complete 
repayment of the loan within one year of filing the bankruptcy petition.82 
The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball filed an objection to 
McCourt’s motion, claiming that the Highbridge financing plan would be 
yet another example of McCourt over-leveraging his club to siphon its 
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revenues for personal use.83 He accused McCourt of alienating “fans, 
sponsors, and business partners, and . . . erod[ing] public confidence in the 
Club.”84 Selig first argued that McCourt failed to satisfy the Bankruptcy 
Code’s burden of proving that “that no better offers, bids, or timely 
proposals [were] before the court”85 because Major League Baseball would 
give the Dodgers a loan on “substantially better terms” than the Highbridge 
financing.86 He explained that the MLB loan would eliminate “excessive 
fees,” such as the $4.5 million commitment fee, while simultaneously 
charging an interest rate 3 percent lower than Highbridge’s loan.87 The cut 
in interest rate alone would save McCourt approximately $4.5 million over 
the course of one year.88 Another important component of the MLB loan 
was its unsecured status. Unlike the Highbridge loan, which would 
encumber all of McCourt’s assets, the loan from the League would not 
require any collateral from the debtors.89 
Selig’s second objection was that Frank McCourt’s solicitation of the 
Highbridge loan, as well as the loan itself, violated Major League 
Baseball’s Governing Documents (the “Governing Documents”) and 
applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Section III of the MLB 
Ownership Guidelines requires that the Commissioner “review and approve 
any agreement that extends loans or other financial accommodations to a 
Major League Baseball Club.”90 The League argued that pursuant to Section 
365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee may not assign a contract that 
would violate the agreements between a club and the League found in the 
Governing Documents without the consent of the League.91 Furthermore, 
any restrictions on this section would be excepted because the Highbridge 
loan would extend debt financing to the benefit of the debtor under Section 
365(e)(2)(B) of the Code.92 Selig further reasoned that the incompatibility 
of the Highbridge loan and the Governing Documents represented an 
“uncurable breach” that rendered the reorganization plan impossible 
without materially impairing the value of the club.93 
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Although the majority of the motion was directed towards the plan, the 
Commissioner revealed his ultimate goal within the filing: the ousting of 
McCourt as the owner of the Los Angeles Dodgers. The language 
throughout the document evidences Selig’s quickly waning patience for 
McCourt’s antics. He accused McCourt of bad faith, claiming the team’s 
bankruptcy petition was a vehicle to “circumvent the Club’s obligations 
under its constituent, governing documents” and to convince the court to 
authorize an “additional debt financing and sale of key assets in violation of 
. . . the obligations that the club has to [Major League Baseball].”94 Despite 
the Code’s clear requirement to make a good faith effort to obtain 
unsecured credit before a loan of Highbridge’s nature, McCourt made no 
effort to obtain credit from his “most significant strategic relationship and 
obvious source of a DIP loan.”95 
However Selig did not stop there. Hoping to completely undermine 
McCourt’s credibility and intentions within the document, the 
Commissioner diligently recounted all of McCourt’s past infringements of 
League agreements: his abandoned promise to provide $30 million of liquid 
equity upon purchase of the team, nondisclosure of reorganizational 
activities, severe overleveraging of the franchise, and the siphoning of team 
funds for personal benefits.96 Finally, Selig ominously questioned whether 
the bankruptcy was valid ab initio. He argued that because he had appointed 
a monitor to make all substantial financial decisions for the team, McCourt 
had no authority to file a Chapter 11 petition without first receiving 
approval.97 McCourt “simply disregarded this requirement” when he 
brought the team into bankruptcy anyway.98 This, Selig argued, raised the 
ultimate threshold issue of “whether or not Mr. McCourt should be 
permitted to retain control of the team in chapter 11.”99 
McCourt spurned the League’s DIP financing plan by officially 
bringing the personal battle with the Commissioner into federal bankruptcy 
court. The Dodgers filed a motion to compel production of documents and 
deposition witnesses in an attempt to justify McCourt’s refusal to negotiate 
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loan terms with Commissioner Selig and the League.100 McCourt’s 
argument was simple: since the commencement of McCourt’s divorce, the 
Commissioner had been acting with the ulterior motive of ousting Frank 
McCourt as the owner of the franchise. More specifically, he accused Selig 
of bad faith and abuse of power when he denied the FOX Sports deal with 
the explicit purpose of “creat[ing] a liquidity crisis” that would “force 
McCourt to miss a payroll.”101 The team further asserted that “MLB has not 
acted in good faith and has treated the Dodgers more severely than other 
baseball teams in comparable circumstances” while “the Commissioner has 
afforded far more favorable treatment and consideration to other owners 
who face financial circumstances far more dire than the [Dodgers].”102 To 
prove this point, McCourt requested documents concerning the financial 
troubles of the New York Mets and any League transactions within that 
context, any Commissioner investigation or monitoring—or decisions not to 
investigate or monitor—similarly situated teams, and team records of 
compliance with MLB’s Debt Service Rule.103 This information would then 
be compared to similar documents relevant to dealings specific to the 
Dodgers and any internal records expressing the League’s consideration 
towards forcing an ownership change or terminating the franchise.104 The 
motion requested that the judge respect McCourt’s exercise of proper 
business judgment in dismissing the League as a viable lender if discovery 
provided sufficient evidence to establish Selig’s purported bias against 
him.105 Judge Gross, ruling in favor of the MLB, emphatically denied the 
motion.106 
B. THE NEW YORK METS 
On March 12, 2009, the infamous Bernard Madoff pleaded guilty to 
fraud charges brought against him for conducting a massive Ponzi scheme 
that shocked the world.107 Fred Wilpon, Saul Katz, and Sterling Equities—
the ownership group of the New York Mets and admitted friends of 
Madoff108—were among the thousands of individuals defrauded by one of 
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the largest financial scandals the industry has ever seen. Over a year and a 
half later, the trustee of Madoff’s bankruptcy estate sued Wilpon and his 
various entities, accusing them of being beneficiaries—not victims—of the 
spurned financial wizard’s web of deceit.109 The lawsuit contended that the 
Sterling partners and their affiliates were educated investors that earned 
“approximately $300 million in fictitious profits” while turning a blind eye 
towards their friend’s questionable investment practices.110 The trustee 
sought nearly $1 billion from the Mets’ owners, stating that they “knew or 
should have known” that their revenue stream was too good to be true, but 
the team’s dependency on Madoff’s investment income led them to choose 
a path of inaction over investigation.111 Wilpon and his constituencies hotly 
contested the trustee’s accusations, claiming that they had no reason to 
suspect Madoff of the crimes he committed and were fooled along with 
securities experts at the SEC.112 
The lawsuit and its monetary consequences compounded the $500 
million in losses realized by the team as a result of their Madoff 
investments,113 sending the Mets into an immediate financial crisis that 
prompted owner Fred Wilpon to issue a statement reinforcing his ability to 
maintain ownership of a financially dysfunctional team.114 Commissioner 
Selig, who was not shy about referring to his thirty-year friendship with 
Wilpon, extended the Mets a $25 million emergency loan to help the team 
cover operating expenses.115 The loan, when viewed in contrast with his 
later dealings with McCourt and the Dodgers, elicited immediate 
comparisons and conclusions drawn by the media.116 As the public battle 
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against Madoff’s estate continued to drain the team’s operating expenses, 
Wilpon sought to generate funds by shopping a $200 million share of the 
franchise to wealthy hedge fund investor David Einhorn.117 Negotiations on 
the deal that could have led to an eventual transfer of majority ownership to 
Einhorn—another long-time friend of Selig’s—hit a snag in July of 2011 
when Wilpon suddenly became dissatisfied with the terms of the deal.118 
The deal officially died in the beginning of November.119 Still, a carefree 
Selig refused to impose a timetable for repayment of the MLB loan on 
Wilpon despite the absence of finite sale plans and any apparent end to the 
period without the promised cash influx.120 Instead, the Commissioner 
approved another bridge loan—this time $40 million from an outside 
lender—in the midst of his uncompromising stance against Frank 
McCourt’s efforts to negotiate his loan with Highbridge Capital.121 
C. MARK CUBAN, THE TEXAS RANGERS, AND THE CHICAGO CUBS 
Another curious case during Commissioner Selig’s tenure was the 2010 
sale of the Texas Rangers franchise out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.122 In 
December of 2009, former Rangers owner Tom Hicks selected a group led 
by Hall of Fame pitcher Nolan Ryan and attorney Chuck Greenberg as the 
exclusive bidders in the sale of his team.123 The two sides reached an 
agreement in January of 2010 that Selig reportedly approved over 
dissenting creditors and two higher bids.124 As creditors continued to 
oppose the deal, Hicks, who had already defaulted on team loans, and 
Major League Baseball brought the team into voluntary Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings to facilitate a pre-packaged plan of reorganization 
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that would push a sale to the Ryan-Greenberg group.125 The filing came on 
the heels of the Commissioner’s threats to utilize his “best interests of 
baseball” power to seize the team and force the sale126 to what he openly 
admitted was his favored group.127 Meanwhile, former lenders claimed the 
plan fell short of what the creditors were owed, and contested the plan so 
vehemently that they threatened to sabotage the process at the expense of 
Ryan and Greenberg’s bid.128 In the middle of the feud between creditors 
and the League, outspoken Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban injected 
himself into the bidding process, joining partner Jim Crane to make the 
most competitive offer to purchase the team.129 The judge presiding over 
the court-ordered auction process eventually awarded the team to the Ryan-
Greenberg group when Cuban and Crane withdrew their more lucrative bid 
after a technicality washed away the surplus of their offer.130 
This was not the first instance that Cuban’s efforts to purchase a Major 
League Baseball team were denied. When Sam Zell and the Chicago 
Tribune opened bidding for the financially embattled Chicago Cubs in 
2008, Cuban’s $1.3 billion offer was the highest initial bid.131 Cuban, who 
is largely credited for the drastic turnaround of the NBA’s Dallas 
Maverick’s franchise, has stated that a sports franchise owner must function 
with two purposes in mind: “first, it’s to work hard to win a championship 
year after year, and second, to be the caretaker of the franchise in the 
community.”132 As owner of the Mavericks, Cuban—Forbe’s 188th richest 
individual in America133—has happily paid some of the highest NBA 
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luxury tax numbers in an effort to accomplish these goals.134 Yet despite the 
seemingly perfect fit of a limitlessly wealthy owner in a non-salary cap 
system, MLB sources repeatedly leaked that there was “no way Bud and the 
owners” would allow Cuban to become the owner of the historically 
tortured franchise.135 Red Sox owner John Henry summarized the situation 
as such: “The commissioner’s office abhors owners who speak their minds 
and fight for the rights of their respective franchises.”136 The Commissioner 
seemed capable of using his influence over the good old boys to block any 
“maverick” owner that might publicly question his decisions. The Cubs, 
like the Rangers, eventually sold the team out of bankruptcy in 2009.137 
D. THE FLORIDA MARLINS 
The Commissioner has also left his fingerprints on the Florida Marlins’ 
twenty-year history. Current owner Jeff Loria purchased the team with the 
aid of an interest free loan from Major League Baseball in a set of 
controversial transactions between the League, the Montreal Expos, the 
Florida Marlins, and the Boston Red Sox.138 Commissioner Selig played a 
vital role in shaping a deal that would essentially ship Loria to the Marlins, 
facilitate Florida’s former owner John Henry’s purchase of the Boston Red 
Sox, and the League’s purchase of Loria’s former team—the Montreal 
Expos.139 Aside from his desire to contract the Montreal franchise, Selig 
had accomplished all of his goals regarding the transaction. 
However it is not only the Commissioner’s acts, but also his inaction, 
that highlight his power over the circumstances surrounding the Marlins 
today. Under Selig’s watch, Loria received more than $198 million of MLB 
revenue-sharing income over the last six years while consistently claiming 
fiscal difficulties in defense of his perpetual bottom-five roster payrolls.140 
This extra revenue, coupled with Loria’s intentional suppression of front 
office expenditures, has made the Marlins one of the most profitable teams 
                                                                                                                           
 134. See generally, Larry Coon, Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap FAQ: 2011 Collective 
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http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/comment/bodley/2002-04-09-bodley.htm. 
 139. Shaikin, Frank McCourt goes on a fishing expedition, supra note 12.  
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of the last five years—but at the expense of the team’s on-field play and 
stadium attendance.141 Despite these annual profits, Loria was allowed to 
cry poor and threaten relocation of the Marlins long enough to work a deal 
in which the Marlins paid only $155 million for the construction of the 
teams new stadium, while saddling the Miami-Dade County taxpayers with 
the $409 million balance.142 
After the truth behind the Marlins’ fiscal stability surfaced, the SEC 
began an investigation into the propriety of the team’s new stadium deal 
with the county.143 The subpoenas have primarily targeted the Marlins, 
hinting the team may have improperly aided the campaign efforts of local 
and state leaders.144 The subpoenas also demand any minutes from Loria’s 
internal board discussions concerning the stadium, including meetings 
between Loria and Commissioner Selig regarding the matter.145 It has 
already been well documented that Robert DuPuy, Major League Baseball’s 
former president and chief operating officer, played a significant role in 
pushing the controversial deal through.146 The quickly forming storm clouds 
ominously indicate that one of two scenarios has played out: either the 
Commissioner played an integral role in Loria’s scheme to find back-door 
financing for the Marlins’ new home; or, he conveniently looked the other 
way as his right hand man facilitated an unlawfully lopsided deal that could 
expose both the team and League to heightened scrutiny and monetary 
liability.147 
III. BRINGING A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: 
THRESHOLD ISSUES 
The remainder of this note will argue that, based on his disparate 
treatment of Major League Clubs and their owners during financial 
struggles, Commissioner Selig has breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
the Los Angeles Dodgers and Major League Baseball as a whole. The case 
of Frank McCourt and the Los Angeles Dodgers makes for an interesting 
test for the viability of the fiduciary duty legal strategy because the 
extensive media coverage of the tenuous owner-Commisioner relationship 
juxtaposed with the New York Mets’ struggles has raised speculation as to 
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the true motives of Commissioner Selig’s lending policies.148 Accordingly, 
the note theorizes what could have happened had McCourt and the Dodgers 
challenged Selig’s powers in court as opposed to agreeing to sell the team 
out of bankruptcy.149 
A. THE EXISTENCE OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Although a breach of fiduciary duty claim does not implicate the 
virtually unbeatable court-made antitrust exemptions Major League 
Baseball enjoys, it nonetheless encounters multiple potential barriers to 
success. An individual or company’s right to bring a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim rests on the theory of agency law and how its principles operate 
within a business setting.150 A fiduciary’s obligation to act in the best 
interests of the principal party is inherent in the nature of an agency 
relationship.151 A principal may have recourse against an agent who 
intentionally or negligently strays from this duty.152 In the corporate 
context, a fiduciary is generally liable for violations of two types of 
fiduciary duties: the individual’s fiduciary duty of care, and the individual’s 
fiduciary duty of loyalty. It is therefore common sense that the penultimate 
threshold to bringing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is the existence of 
the duty itself. 
The unique qualities of Major League Baseball’s governance structure 
pose significant hardship to a Club owner seeking recourse against the 
Commissioner or the League as a whole. Because the League is categorized 
as an unincorporated association, a Commissioner could theoretically argue 
that the principles of corporate fiduciary duties are wholly inapplicable. 
When owner Al Davis and the Oakland Raiders challenged former NFL 
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue on the grounds of breach of fiduciary duty, 
the California Court of Appeal bent over backwards to reject the theory.153 
The court recognized that because the NFL was a unique business 
organization that did not neatly fit the “model of fiduciary duties owed by 
majority shareholders to their corporation and to minority shareholders,” 
the “question of whether the NFL or its commissioner owes fiduciary duties 
to one of the NFL’s member clubs” was a matter of first impression.154 It 
                                                                                                                           
 148. Rhoden, Dissecting the Twin Tales of Teams in Distress, supra note 8.  
 148. Sandomir, The Dodgers, the Mets and the Commissioner, supra note 9. 
 149. Bill Shaikin, MLB Agreement Says Frank McCourt Must Sell Dodgers by End of April, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/07/sports/la-sp-1208-dodgers-mlb-
20111208-9. 
 150. “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests 
assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject 
to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
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argued that a fiduciary relationship between the Commissioner and a 
member team could not possibly exist because a fiduciary is required to act 
in the best interests of the beneficiary, and the job requirements of a league 
commissioner often mandate him to do the opposite.155 The court justified 
this line of reasoning by highlighting acts like arbitrating and enforcing 
rules where the team may disagree, or hurting the team’s competitiveness 
by employing his disciplinary powers to punish a player or coach.156 As a 
result, its “comprehensive review of the NFL constitution” showed that 
there was no reason to find the Commissioner had agreed to assume any 
fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the league’s member clubs.157 
The court couples the most restrictive view of the league constitution 
with the most literal application of the definition of a fiduciary duty in an 
effort to avoid the very nature of a voluntary association.158 Instead, a 
perhaps “less comprehensive” review of the Major League Constitution’s 
contents would have sufficed. Article I plainly states that the Constitution is 
an agreement among the member clubs, “each of which shall be entitled to 
the benefits of and shall be bound by all the terms and provisions” of the 
document.159 Article II of the Constitution gives the Commissioner the 
power to do what is necessary to ensure that “the best interests of the 
national game of Baseball” are protected for the benefit of the parties to the 
agreement.160 Contrary to the Oakland Raiders court’s view, the most 
logical interpretation of the actual governing documents is the most literal 
reading of the document: the “benefits” of the agreement would include the 
Commissioner’s good faith judgment to act in the best interests of the game. 
Accordingly, each team should have the right to enjoy those benefits, as 
provided in Article I.161 It would be illogical to argue that the Commissioner 
does not owe a fiduciary duty to the League as a whole when the document 
mirrors the inherent nature of the fiduciary relationship—a commissioner 
(the agent) must act in the best interests of the association (the principal).162 
To segregate a commissioner’s duty to protect a financially distressed team 
for the benefit of a league from a commissioner’s duty to treat each 
financially distressed team evenhandedly would be equally illogical. 
                                                                                                                           
 155. “The breadth of the commissioner’s powers plainly shows that there are numerous and 
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The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
recognized the same tension and uncertainty between corporate and 
association law that the Oakland Raiders court highlighted.163 It drafted the 
Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (RUUNAA) to 
provide insight as to where this type of organizational structure falls within 
the law, and to create a more comprehensive guide for governing 
unincorporated associations.164 The conference also recognized the need to 
protect both a voluntary association and its members from managers that 
breach their fiduciary duties. Section 23 of RUUNAA explicitly states, “A 
manager owes to the unincorporated nonprofit association and to its 
members the duties of loyalty, care and good faith.”165 Although Delaware 
has yet to adopt RUUNAA, it did adopt its predecessor, the Uniform 
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act in 1997.166 This act broadly 
states that “principles of law and equity” govern unincorporated 
associations unless otherwise stated.167 The state’s embracement of the Act 
is evidence that its legislature intended for unincorporated associations to 
be protected by the rest of Delaware law—a body of law which happens to 
be the richest compilation of corporate law in the nation. Furthermore, the 
MLB Constitution’s designation of the Commissioner as chief executive 
officer and Chairman is evidence that the League intended his position to be 
guided by the same principles as a corporate CEO and board director.168 
B. WAIVER OF RECOURSE 
Once McCourt has established that a fiduciary duty exists, a major 
obstacle still remains: does he have standing to bring such a claim?169 
Article VI, Section 2 of the MLB Constitution states that it is in the best 
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interests of the game for teams to accept and comply with the decisions of 
the Commissioner, and to be “finally and unappealably bound” by his 
actions pursuant to the Major League Constitution.170 It further provides 
that each team “waive[s] such right of recourse to the courts as would 
otherwise have existed in their favor.”171 Throughout the Dodgers’ 
bankruptcy proceedings, the Commissioner repeatedly asserted that 
McCourt was subject to the League’s governing documents, including this 
waiver of recourse provision.172 As such, the Commissioner argued, 
McCourt lacked standing to litigate against the Commissioner because he 
had forfeited his right to challenge the Commissioner’s decisions in 
court.173 On its face, the provision seems detrimental to any hypothetical 
challenge that McCourt may bring. However, another look into the general 
principles of association and corporate law will prove otherwise. 
Again, RUUNAA serves as a helpful guide to the governance issues 
presented by McCourt’s hypothetical challenge of the Commission’s 
Powers.174 Much like the principles of traditional corporate law, Section 
23(e) of RUUNAA allows an unincorporated association to contract around 
the default rules proposed in the uniform code.175 It states that an 
association’s governing documents may limit, and even eliminate, a 
manager’s liability for certain actions or nonfeasance.176 However this 
ability to limit liability is not unchecked, as the section later explicitly states 
that a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty does not fall within its 
parameters.177 Although the section’s comments distinguish a fiduciary’s 
duty of loyalty from a more general duty of good faith,178 this separation of 
analysis was common due to the muddled judicial history regarding what is, 
and what is not, a fiduciary duty.179 The Committee—apparently realizing 
the distinction runs counter to Delaware’s rulings that “good faith” is a 
subsidiary of a director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty180—has since put forth 
amendments that eliminate the comments that confuse its desire to shield an 
                                                                                                                           
 170. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. VI, § 2(a). 
 171. Id.  
 172. See Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity or, In the Alternative, to 
Compel the Debtors to Seek Assumption or Rejection of the Baseball Agreements at 14, In re Los 
Angeles Dodgers LLC, 468 B.R. 652 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (No. 11-12010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/66102703/MLB-Motion-to-Terminate. 
 173. MLB Opposition to Motion to Compel, supra note 169, at 12. 
 174. See REVISED UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACT (RUUNAA)  
§ 23(e) (2008). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. “The governing principles in a record may limit or eliminate the liability of a manager . . . 
for damages for any action taken, or failure to take any action, as a manager, except liability for . . 
. breach of the duty of loyalty . . . .”  RUUNAA § 23(e)(4) (emphasis added). 
 178. See RUUNAA § 23 cmt.2. 
 179. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding 
Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007). 
 180. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
2013] Permeating the Good Old Boys Club 499 
unincorporated association’s manager from acts of bad faith.181 This 
approach is consistent with state statutes that specifically carve out breaches 
of fiduciary duty and acts in bad faith as exceptions to a business entity’s 
ability to contract around a manager’s fiduciary duties.182 
Still, these new principles will undoubtedly face a familiar defense that 
old common law has repeatedly upheld this exact waiver of recourse 
provision.183 In Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, the court found the 
Article VII, Section 1 waiver was in accordance with the common law 
principle that courts should generally refrain from reviewing the issues 
centered on the bylaws of a voluntary association.184 However, the court did 
explicitly acknowledge the existence of exceptions to non-reviewability—
one of which opens the door for the challenge central to this note.185 It 
stated that matters and actions of private association may be subject to 
review “where the rules, regulations or judgments of the association are in 
contravention to the laws of the land or in disregard of the charter or bylaws 
of the association.”186 Under this exception, a Major League owner could 
successfully argue that the waiver of recourse runs contrary to the long-
determined principle that an agent, manager, and director of an organization 
must abide by his fiduciary responsibilities to his organization.187 
The concurring opinion of Chief Judge Fairchild took an even more 
liberal approach.188 He characterized the narrow exceptions and binding 
force provided by the majority as “sweeping” and arguably contrary to the 
then current trend that such waivers were unenforceable and void in the 
state of Illinois.189 He further surmised, “While the scope of review of the 
Commissioner’s decision is extremely narrow, I believe that it could be 
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overturned if Finley could establish that he was denied a fair hearing 
because the Commissioner was biased or motivated by malice.”190 
Although the Chief Judge spoke directly to the procedural issue of fair 
hearing implicated within Finley,191 there is no indication that he intended 
this reasoning to be limited to a due process analysis. This interpretation 
would add significant momentum to any prospective claim brought against 
Commissioner Selig for breaching his fiduciary duty by acting in bad faith, 
and would have been particularly helpful to Frank McCourt’s hypothetical 
allegations that Selig’s personal biases were the basis for disparate 
scrutiny.192 In court, McCourt would have advanced the strong argument 
that the judge’s reasoning turned not on procedural due process, but instead 
on the presence of bias or malice that infiltrated the Commissioner’s 
decision.193 
IV. THEORIES OF THE CLAIM 
This note has thus far outlined a plan of attack that Frank McCourt 
could have used to conquer the initial hurdles of bringing a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against the Commissioner.194 However after these 
threshold issues have been addressed, a plaintiff still must establish that the 
defendant did in fact breach his fiduciary duty. The Commissioner could 
have done this in two ways: a breach of his fiduciary duty of care or a 
breach of his fiduciary duty of loyalty.195 The constant struggle between a 
plaintiff’s desire to bring a claim for fiduciary duty of loyalty and a 
defendant’s efforts to nudge the court towards a duty of care analysis has 
been well documented.196 It has been further clouded by the Delaware 
decisions of In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation—which 
indicated that a director’s duty of good faith was a separate fiduciary 
duty197—and Stone v. Ritter—which seemed to back-track a few steps in 
claiming that good faith was a “subsidiary element” of the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty.198 Because McCourt’s accusations that Commissioner Selig’s 
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personal animus towards McCourt has dismantled the objectivity of his 
decision-making process rather than the traditional “interested director” 
duty of loyalty, his case seems to fly directly into the uncharted territory of 
“duty of good faith” as presented by Disney and Stone.199 This section will 
continue to walk us through McCourt’s hypothetical challenge of the 
Commissioner’s powers by showing how McCourt could bypass the 
defendant-friendly safe haven of the business judgment rule and 
successfully navigate the ever-evolving concepts of the duties of good faith 
and loyalty. 
A. OVERCOMING THE COMMISSIONER’S SAFE HAVEN: THE “BEST 
INTERESTS” CLAUSE DISGUISED AS THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE 
A director’s fiduciary duty of care focuses on the reasonableness of the 
individual’s decision-making process, but does not attempt to evaluate the 
substantive quality of the ultimate decision.200 The doctrine, known as the 
business judgment rule, broadly protects a director when he makes an 
informed, good faith decision using his professional judgment and 
expertise.201 This deference to a fiduciary’s business judgment is predicated 
on the policy argument that allowing intense judicial scrutiny of business 
decisions will inhibit business growth by discouraging managers and 
directors to take beneficial risks.202 In order to conquer this doctrine in 
Delaware, a plaintiff has the burden to prove that the defendant directors 
acted with “gross negligence” throughout their decision-making process.203 
Article II of the Major League Agreement conveys virtually limitless 
power to the Commissioner while running the broad operations of the game 
and its day-to-day business operations.204 Broadly speaking, one may 
compare Article II’s “best interest” clause to a built-in business judgment 
rule inherent in the MLB governing documents—and courts have 
sometimes treated the power strikingly similar to their deference to a 
corporate officer’s decision-making process in the past.205 Commissioner 
Selig repeatedly highlighted that line of reasoning throughout the 
bankruptcy proceedings of the Los Angeles Dodgers, and would likely 
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continue to do so in any other defense of his power.206 The doctrine 
presumes good faith, and McCourt would bear the burden of rebutting that 
presumption by showing that Selig’s actions were uninformed and not in 
the best interests of baseball.207 Therefore, if challenged in the corporate 
context under business judgment rule, his decision in the case of the 
Dodgers—and the process that led to that decision—would likely be 
evaluated on a rational basis standard that would isolate it from any other 
similar decisions.208 Given the Commissioner’s hands-on investigation that 
produced his letter detailing the “best interests” basis for his denial of the 
proposed television deal with FOX Sports to McCourt,209 it is highly 
unlikely the court would find Selig to be an uninformed director. Further, 
the court would be unlikely to find Selig’s decision irrational or 
unreasonable when analyzed in the narrow confines of the Dodgers’ 
owner’s actions alone. Selig would continue to advance the nature of the 
owner’s lavish lifestyle detailed in the McCourt divorce and correlate the 
non-baseball related payouts of the FOX Sports loan as evidence of 
McCourt’s refusal to change his methods of ownership.210 Without the 
benefit of reviewing his leniency in other situations of financially distressed 
teams, the inflammatory nature of the Dodgers’ recent history would lead 
any reasonable person to conclude that the Commissioner was not grossly 
negligent or irrational in his in deciding whether this particular situation 
was in the best interests of the game.211 
Instead, the circumstances of his case would advise McCourt to tip-toe 
around the business judgment rule. Although the Delaware legislature’s 
enactment of Section 102(b)(7) reinforced the rule by allowing a 
corporation to further protect its directors by amending its certificate of 
incorporation to eliminate liability for duty of care,212 it has also had the 
effect of diverting plaintiff suits toward breach of duty of loyalty claims. As 
a result, the provision has evolved into an affirmative defense that directors 
have used to funnel these suits back into the realm of duty of care, and 
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consequently the exculpatory certificates.213 Commissioner Selig would 
likely supplement his plea for deference to his “best interests judgment” by 
pointing again to the MLB Constitution’s waiver of recourse, in an attempt 
to invoke a 102(b)(7) defense. 
But not all “uninterested director” roads under the statute lead towards 
the dead-end business judgment rule. In Malpiede v. Townson, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware indicated that there may be a way to lift the bar created 
by 102(b)(7).214 A plaintiff who pleads facts sufficient to establish a 
possible breach of loyalty or bad faith would surpass the affirmative 
defense afforded by the legislature and allow for the assertion of the 
respective breach of fiduciary duty case.215 Therefore, where Judge Gross 
found that his hearings were “not a referendum on the commissioner or 
other teams” because the Dodgers’ bankruptcy was solely concerned with 
the team’s affairs,216 a civil court would certainly be deemed an acceptable 
venue for a personal challenge centered on accusations of prejudiced and 
unfair enforcement of MLB rules. In filing his complaint, McCourt would 
be free to make these very accusations, as well as advance the arguments 
and preliminary evidence brought forth in Part II of this note without the 
presupposed deference that has benefitted commissioners in the past. The 
abundance of information uncovered by the media, coupled with the high 
publicity and transparency of the Mets and Dodgers’ legal and ownership 
situations, would likely be enough to warrant the extensive discovery that 
McCourt was denied in the Los Angeles Dodgers’ bankruptcy 
proceedings.217  
B. TESTING THE MURKY WATERS OF GOOD FAITH AND THE DUTY 
OF LOYALTY 
While a fiduciary duty of care analysis would be confined to the 
Commissioner’s judgment in this one specific case, either a breach of a duty 
of good faith or loyalty claim would likely open the door to a more 
complete and comprehensive review. In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court 
made a fairly distinct doctrinal statement by explicitly recognizing that “the 
universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the 
classic sense . . . or gross negligence.”218 There is, in fact, a wide gap in 
which a director or officer’s actions will fall between a traditional conflict 
of interest transaction and the gross negligence required in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom’s duty of care analysis.219 The court seemed to ultimately pry a 
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fiduciary’s duty of good faith from the grasp of the business judgment rule 
by focusing on two types of bad faith conduct: (1) subjective bad faith,220 
and (2) a conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities.221 The latter of the 
two, despite being less reprehensible, still did not fall under the saving 
grace of 102(b)(7).222 This liberation of the fiduciary concept of good faith 
was short lived, as Delaware’s high court promptly reined good faith in 
under the umbrella of duty of loyalty less than one year later in Stone v. 
Ritter.223 Under the court’s analysis, the duty of good faith was merely a 
subsidiary of the duty of loyalty, and would not be considered an 
independent ground for liability.224 
Although Stone v. Ritter questions the success of a claim based solely 
on the grounds of a breach of good faith, it specifically recognizes the 
duty’s existence within the duty of loyalty.225 Presumably then, a finding of 
bad faith would still come through the existence of conduct within the 
Disney court’s two categories.226 For similar reasons as to why McCourt’s 
case would fail under the business judgment rule, it would be equally 
unlikely that the owner could succeed if he asserted the first category of 
subjective bad faith.227 However, McCourt may effectively argue that 
Selig’s lack of recognizable standards in deciding when and when not to 
enforce his investigative and lending powers falls squarely within Disney’s 
middle ground of “conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities.”228 
One way a fiduciary may exhibit bad faith is by intentionally acting 
with a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the corporation.229 
Article II, Section 4 of the Major League Constitution provides that in 
acting in the best interests of the League, the Commissioner shall exercise 
his authority to maintain “the integrity of, and public confidence in the 
national game of Baseball.”230 The public’s perception of the 
competitiveness of the League and its member teams are embedded in the 
definitions of both integrity and public confidence.231 McCourt would be 
apt to point out that the lack of a cohesive standard in facilitating the 
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rehabilitation of financially struggling franchises is in stark opposition of 
these very goals.232 The claim is further strengthened by the fact that the 
MLB Constitution renders the presence of an actual bias irrelevant—merely 
the public’s perception of a bias would suffice.233 Commissioner Selig 
would be left to defend himself against a notion already present in the 
media that his personal agendas have consistently guided his decisions. He 
would have to account for his steadfast refusal of the Dodgers’ financing 
from sources outside of Major League Baseball,234 while he has let Fred 
Wilpon and the New York Mets sit on a no-payment $25 million League 
loan235 and approved further debt financing from an outside lender when 
that money ran out a year later.236 The Commissioner would likewise be 
called to explain why he believed guiding the Texas Rangers into 
bankruptcy at the expense of creditors while simultaneously fending off a 
higher bidder in Cuban helped the public’s confidence in the national game 
of baseball.237 McCourt would further inquire as to why Selig—outside of a 
potential disruption to his mild-mannered “good old boys club”—would 
deny the bid of a potential owner who pledged virtually limitless funds to 
resurrecting a historically tortured and debt-ridden Cubs franchise was in 
the best interests of the team or the League.238 
Under Disney, McCourt may also show that the Commissioner lacked 
good faith by intentionally failing to act in the face of a known duty to do 
so.239 Article II, Section 2(b) gives the Commissioner broad powers to 
investigate, on his own accord, any act he perceives to be detrimental to the 
best interests of baseball.240 Selig consistently relies on this power to defend 
any actions that consequently lead to questioning his authority.241 If 
McCourt were to bring this suit, he should contend that the Commissioner’s 
constant reliance on this broad power demands that he invoke it whenever 
his fiduciary obligation to act in the game’s best interests require him to do 
so. This theory would be advanced most efficiently by raising the question 
of how the Commissioner makes these determinations, while 
simultaneously comparing the Dodgers’ situations with the Mets’ and 
Marlins’ to prove that the Commissioner’s process and substance of his 
decisions are inconsistent. He would have to define the rubric that guided 
him to the decision that irresponsible spending on a lavish marriage 
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warranted a fiscal monitor that stripped McCourt of his ownership rights242 
while the potential liability in a multibillion-dollar lawsuit that implicated 
the Wilpons in a massive securities fraud scheme did not.243 McCourt 
would also call to light how Selig continuously acquiesced to Marlins 
owner Jeff Loria’s repeated manipulation of the MLB revenue sharing 
rules,244 and how he may have aided the “swindlers who run the Florida 
Marlins” rob an entire county blind.245 By highlighting the Commissioner’s 
past trend of picking and choosing when to invoke his best interests power 
in the face of his own contentions that he has a duty to act, McCourt would 
have a strong case when bringing his bad faith claim under Disney’s 
inaction avenue.246 
V. FINDING A PLACE FOR THE COMMISSIONER’S CONDUCT—
AND GOOD FAITH 
Two final questions remain: (1) how, exactly, should the duty of good 
faith operate within the duty of loyalty after Stone v. Ritter?; and, (2) should 
the Commissioner’s game of favorites fall within that category? Stone v. 
Ritter has clarified that as a subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty, a 
director may be liable indirectly for acting in bad faith, but that bad faith 
alone will not create liability without proving more.247 Does a conscious 
disregard of one’s responsibility fueled by the favoritism of a partial 
decision maker’s personal relations prove enough disloyalty to warrant 
culpability? I propose it does. To find a case where a corporate director or 
officer acted with subjective bad faith, yet still remained loyal, would be an 
incredibly difficult task.248 To find the same for a manager of an 
unincorporated association who, as suggested in Section III, owes a 
fiduciary duty to each member of that association would be virtually 
impossible. Likewise, protecting the “integrity” and “public perception” 249 
of baseball by disproportionately aiding teams is counter-intuitive to what a 
reasonable person would find as a good faith effort to act “in the best 
interests of the game.” Commissioner Selig has not met his duty to act in 
good faith towards the Dodgers, or Major League Baseball.250 As such, he 
should be forced to defend himself in a suit for a breach of fiduciary duty of 
loyalty to both entities.251 Even if McCourt were to lose such a challenge, 
the goal of this note will have been accomplished: the Commissioner would 
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have been held to a fiduciary standard, and the public’s confidence in the 
integrity of the League’s manager—and the national game—would be 
restored. 
CONCLUSION 
This note has discussed the broad power afforded to the Commissioner 
of Major League Baseball by the League’s governing documents. Recently, 
Commissioner Bud Selig has used these powers to take a hands-on 
approach in shaping the ownership statuses of several financial distressed 
teams. His actions have led both the media and public to question the 
impartiality of his decision-making process. As a result, the Commissioner 
has undermined the integrity and public perception of the game he has been 
entrusted to protect. Because the “best interests of baseball” power is 
steadfastly used to defend blatantly questionable decisions, the limits of the 
clause must be tested in court. As this note details, the proper vehicle to 
bring such a challenge of the Commissioner’s power is a lawsuit that claims 
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